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Catalogue Essay - 10 Rooms and a Scupture Garden

Foreword

There is a tendency in art related debates to focus attention on very specific questions or areas of concern, questions which are no doubt important but which never seem satisfactorily answered. We ask what it is to be a work of art and, separately, what it is for a property or experience to be aesthetic. We try to explain how artworks have meanings and how we are to locate those meanings. We not only debate the merits of different artworks but also question how such values can be attached to them at all.
These are not artificial questions; they are not the product of purely academic curiosity. Furthermore, they are not unhelpful questions. However, there is a sense in which an attempt to answer one question inevitably points us in the direction of another.

In his essay The New Institutional Theory of Art George Dickie examined the problem of distinguishing artworks from other objects. He concludes with a convincing attempt at a definition of what an artwork is but admits that definition is circular in that the terms he uses (“artist”, “public”, “artworld”, “artworld system” and “work of art”) create a logically circular set. As a result the definition fails to reduce the term “work of art” to more basic terms, and so doesn’t achieve what is the typical aim of a definition.

Dickie defends his definition by arguing that the circularity is non-vicious and therefore ultimately doesn’t undermine his argument, and his defence is a persuasive one. However, it is what emerges from this defence that is of particular interest. What originates as a focused argument concerning the very specific matter of identifying artworks from other objects leads to an illustrative account of how we come to be part of the artistic system, a system which incorporates artists and their intentions, artworks and the public.

It is telling then that in attempting to subject art to formal debate, to pin down the key notions tied into it, we end up taking a step back and looking at it in broader terms. Perhaps then, while focused and detailed investigation is nonetheless important, we should appreciate that if we are to understand art and artworks better it is necessary for us simply to become involved in this vast, social activity. That is to say, that at the heart of the matter lies the peculiar interaction between the artist, his work and his audience and that can only be appreciated if we make ourselves part of that.

It would be incorrect to say that this interaction, this involvement in artistic activity, has to be uncritical. Our understanding of artworks is frequently aided by placing them within some sort of intellectual context. However, a lot of what gives art its immediate significance seems to take place on a more basic level.

As an audience we might start by considering the works themselves, as distinct objects and try to ascribe some significance to them. However, what soon becomes apparent is that our attention is not simply directed at these objects in themselves. Instead we assess our own reactions to them and on top of that try to develop an understanding of the artist and the artistic process.

It is too easy to look at works of art as a particular class of thing and to try to consider this class in isolation. However, to do so can often be to ignore the fact that they form only part of a wider activity. Whatever the end result, the making of a work of art, that combination of the artist and his intentions with the resultant declamatory act is of equal significance. Similarly, the perception of a work of art by an audience, the way that audience interacts with it and the way it impacts on them is important.

If arguments concerning specific aspects of art lead inevitably towards circularity, because of the inflected nature of art and the terminology we apply to it, chiselling away at isolated aspects of it will sometimes be misguided. Circularity in arguments bothers us because it suggests that there is no route in from the outside. However if, as an audience, we simply become part of this wide social activity and become able to participate in it, then that analytical circularity need not necessarily worry us.


Will Seymour



Endnote

Whenever we use a word or a phrase, it is deployed within the context of a specific set of norms and its meaning is derived from its position in relation to these rules. As several philosophers and social scientists have since pointed out, these norms should be understood in relation to social conventions, and the usage of words viewed as an inferentially social action. To grasp the meaning of a word or a phrase, it is necessary to place it in the immediate context of understood linguistic rules and the more distant context of its social function. In terms of books, to recover the meaning of a particular work, it is vital that we ‘close the context’ around it, placing the author’s statements in the setting of contemporary linguistic conventions and locating the work in relation to the condition of its intended audience.

This so-called “use” theory of language can be applied to works of art and underpins the manner in which most people are accustomed to view pieces at an exhibition. Having been selected for display in a gallery, a particular work is seen as conforming to a particular set of norms that are conditioned by its institutional and social context. Its import and meaning is gauged not only against a preconceived conception of “art”, but also in relation to the work’s environment and origins. At one level, its inclusion in an exhibition suggest that it should be located within the broader schema of artistic endeavour and frequently branded with a label referring a movement or “project”. At another level, it is understood in relation to the artist’s own background and his location within a social context which includes both other artists and the viewer. The significance and meaning of the work are, in other words, recovered from its apparently social usage.

It should be noted that in recent years, there has been something of a backlash against an “institutional” view of art. Many are now unwilling to approach or evaluate pieces from the perspective of the institution in which they are displayed. This, however, has not necessarily made their method of viewing any more coherent. The notion that the context of an institution can provide meaning has to a large extent been abandoned, however the attempt to view works of art with reference to a particular universal “language” remains dominant. Without institutions to fall back on, debate has shifted to the nature of art. ‘What is art?’ is nothing less than an attempt to uncover a universal set of rules governing composition and reception. Yet, the work of art exists as an abstract unconnected with definite signs, and such an endeavour has not only proved fruitless but has also failed to provide a workable intellectual framework for observation of it. “Art” as a point of appeal remains elusive and evaluative statements inevitably disintegrate into the facile and the specious.

If the absence of commonly accepted signs within the “artistic society” inhibits the recovery of meaning through the application of rules, how should works of art be viewed? Is it possible to look at works of art in any logically satisfying manner at all?

A solution to this problem does exist and can, peculiarly enough, be derived from the “use” theory of language. The absence of a common set of signs does not mean that a work has no capacity to communicate with the viewer. It remains a social object produced for the purpose of being viewed and hence presupposes comprehension. The fact of the work’s production itself remains a proof of its significance and import. The terms in which that communication is mounted, however, and the rules – however informal or basic – which govern their relationship, consist entirely in the work itself. Effectively, the work is in and of itself a language, accessible to all, comprehensible to all, but approachable only as a singular produced object.

This can be put in more practical terms. When an artist composes a work, he does so with the purpose of it being seen. He wishes to state something or make a declaration of sorts. In assembling the piece, he may make use of a particular notion of artistic composition, but he does so willingly and selectively. As such, his work cannot fully be understood in relation to others. He may absorb or break with ambient ideas as he sees fit without compromising the communicative capacity of his work. When he paints, or draws or sculpts or arranges, an artist manipulates the components and the concepts/things to which they refer in his own fashion, unique to that moment. When he creates a work, he in every respect creates his own “language”, the elements of which obey their own unique rules. These signs and rules – however simplistic or complex – must, by virtue of their being elements of a communicative work, be comprehensible to the viewer, but can only be understood fully in their own terms.


Alexander Lee